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RECENT DECISIONS
COMMONWEALTH~

CASS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Commonwealth v. Cass,l the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa
chusetts held that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of
the vehicular homicide statute. 2 Relying heavily on a 1975 decision in
which it interpreted "person" to include the viable unborn for the pur
poses of civil wrongful death actions, 3 the court in Cass saw no reason
to apply a different definition to the term in this criminal action.4 The
court was satisfied, furthermore, that the primary goal of the doctrine
of strict construction of criminal statutes, fair. warning as to the scope
of criminalliability,5 was adequately served by a prospective applica
tion of the new rule. 6
The victim in Cass, an eight and one-half month old fetus, died as
the result of internal injuries after the defendant's vehicle struck the
victim's mother.7 The defendant was charged in district court with
vehicular homicide. 8 Both parties subsequently requested that the dis
1. 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984).
2. Id. at 808, 467 N.E.2d at 1330. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24G (West
1984).
3. Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
4. 392 Mass. at 801, 467 N.E.2d at 1326.
5. See infra notes 55 and 60 and accompanying text.
6. 392 Mass. at 804, 467 N.E.2d at 1327. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
7. Id. at 799·80, 467 N.E.2d at 1325.
8. That statute provides:
Whoever, upon any way or in any place to which the public has a right of
access or upon any way or in any place to which members of the public have
access as invitees or licensees, operates a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor, or of marihuana, narcotic drugs, depressants or stimulant
substances, all as defined in section one of chapter ninety-four C, or the vapors of
glue, or whoever operates a motor vehicle recklessly or negligently so that the
lives or safety of the public might be endangered and by any such operation
causes the death of another person, shaH be guilty of homicide by a motor vehicle
and shaH be punished by imprisonment in a jailor house of correction for not less
than thirty days nor more than two and one-half years, or by a fine of not less
than three hundrea nor more than three thousand doHars, or both.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24G(b) (West 1984).
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trict court report the case to the appeals court on a statement of
agreed facts. The supreme judicial court transferred the case for re
view upon its own motion. 9
Section 24G(b) is concerned with the death of a "person" caused
by the operation of a motor vehicle. Nowhere in the section is "per
son" defined.lO Other state courts have uniformly held that such stat
utes were not intended to include the killing of the unborn, but rather
are merely codifications of the common law definition of homicide
which requires that the "person" be born alive. I I

II.

BACKGROUND

At common law, the requirement of live birth extended to civil
wrongful death actions.12 Indeed, the requirement persisted as an in
terpretation of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute l3 until quite
recently. In Leccese v: McDonough,14 the supreme judicial court re
fused to allow recovery for the wrongful death of a fetus that, while
born, was not born alive. IS The court supported its decision with a
long line of precedent, emphasized that speculation as to the viability
of the fetus would be avoided with such a rule, and pointed to the
legislature as the appropriate source of any future change in the law. 16
In Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 17 Leccese was explicitly over
ruled and the born alive requirement was abolished for civil actions
under the wrongful death statute. IS In rejecting the born alive rule,
the court in Mone acknowledged the extensive precedent for the rule
9. 392 Mass. at 799, 467 N.E.2d at 1324-25.
10. See supra, note 8.
11. See, e.g., People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980) for
interpretation that "death of another" does not include death of the unborn for purposes of
vehicular homicide statute; State v. Dickenson, 28 Ohio St.2d 65, 275 N.E.2d 599 (1971);
State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978). See State v. Willis, 98 N.M. 771, 652 P.2d
1222 (1982) for interpretation that a fetus is not a "human being" for purposes of vehicular
homicide statute; State ex rei. A.W.S., 182 N.J. Super. 278, 440 A.2d 1144 (1981). See
State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 (R.I. 1982) for interpretation that a fetus is not a "person"
within the meaning of the vehicular homicide statute. See also Annot., 40 ALR 3d 444, at
447 (1971). Most recently, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has indicated that fetuses
are included within the meaning of "person" in a manslaughter statute. See State v. Horne,
No. 22157, slip op. (Aug. 17, 1984).
12. See Winfield, The Unborn Child, 8 CAMB. L.J. 76, 84-85 (1942). See also Annot.,
15 A.L.R. 3d 993 (1967).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1974).
14. Leccese v. McDonough, 361 Mass. 64, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1972).
15. Id. at 67, 279 N.E.2d at 341.
16. Id.
17. 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975).
18. Id. at 360, 331 N.E.2d at 919.
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but pointed out that the majority of American jurisdictions have re
placed the rule with the requirement that the fetus simply be viable. 19
The court was satisfied that a simple viability requirement would in
troduce no more speculation than the typical tort claims involving
medical determinations. 20 Finally, the court in Mone pointed to deci
sions subsequent to Leccese that recognized the common law origins of
the right to recovery for wrongful death. 21 Consequently, the court in
Mone took the view that courts have the power to "make changes in
the common law, rather than to wait for the Legislature, where such
changes . . . would not seriously impair an existing interest, disap
point an expectation, or defeat a reliance. "22
One year after the Mone decision, the supreme judicial court in
Commonwealth v. Edelin 23 faced the question as to whether a fetus
was a "person" within the meaning of a criminal statute. The court in
Edelin reversed a lower court conviction of a physician for manslaugh
ter when it held that the abortion of a six month old fetus in the nor
mal course of the physician's practice at Boston City Hospital was not
an action causing the death of a "person."24 The Commonwealth the
orized that "upon the detachment of the placenta, the fetus became a
'person' within the manslaughter statute."25 The court insisted that
"(o)nly when a fetus had been born alive outside its mother could it
become a 'person' within the meaning of the statute."26 The court
summarily distinguished Mone as a civil case and, therefore, not
controlling.27
In addition to the concerns ofjudicial precedent, speculation as to
fetus viability, and difficulty in administering a rule other than the
born alive rule, the Edelin decision reflects the overriding considera
tion of the court as to the appropriateness of changing the widespread
understanding of words in a criminal statute. 28 Criminal laws, as con
19. Id. at 357 & n.5, 331 N.E.2d at 918 & n.5.
20. Id. at 360, 331 N.E.2d at 919.
21. Id. at 358-59, 331 N.E.2d at 918.
22. Id. at 359, 331 N.E.2d at 918-919.
23. 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976).
24. Id. at 509, 359 N.E.2d at 10. The normal procedure of abortion by saline injec
tion into the amniotic sac had failed and the physician was forced to remove the fetus by
manually detaching the placenta from the uterine wall. /d. at 502-03, 359 N.E.2d at 7.
25. Id. at 509, 359 N.E.2d at 10. While affirming the born alive rule, three Justices
thought that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on the question of whether the
fetus was born alive. Id. at 517, 359 N.E.2d at 15.
26. Id. at 509, 359 N.E.2d at 10.
27. Id. at 513 n.23, 359 N.E.2d at 12 n.23.
28. Considerable criticism exists because while tort and property law recognize the
legal rights of the unborn, criminal law does not. See, e.g., Note, The Law and the Unborn
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trasted with civil laws, impose sanctions that characteristically involve
loss of liberty or life; statutes that impose restrictions on these consti
tutionally protected rights are construed strictly.29 Strict construction
of criminal statutes was propounded as a doctrine in 1820 by the
United States Supreme Court as an acknowledgement of exclusive
power vested in the legislature to create criminal laws. 30 The doctrine
has been followed in Massachusetts since 1850.J1 Against this back
ground, the meaning of "person" in a criminal statute was again ques
tioned in Casso
III.

THE CASS DECISION

In Cass, the supreme judicial court justified its decision to abolish
the born alive requirement for the purposes of the vehicular homicide
statute on two grounds. The first arises from the fact that the Legisla
ture enacted the vehicular homicide statute after the Mone decision. 32
The court pointed to no legislative history to support an assumption
that the legislature considered the impact of Mone, a civil case, on the
meaning of "person" in the vehicular homicide statute, but stated "we
Child, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349 (1971). Critics acknowledge nonetheless that within
criminal law the born alive rule is applied consistently everywhere in the United States. See
Comment, The Role of the Law of Homicide in Fetal Destruction, 56 IOWA L. REV. 658,
659 (1971).
29. See generally J.P. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY
CRIMES (1873).
The law delights in the life, liberty, and happiness of the subject; and deems stat
utes which deprive him of these, or of his property, however necessary they may
be, in a sense odious. Therefore, and for kindred reasons, as well as for the reason
that every man should be able to show certainly when he is guilty of a crime,
statutes which subject one to a punishment . . . are to be construed strictly.
Id. at 127-28.
30. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820). Chief Justice
Marshall stated for the court that:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old
than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested
in the legislative not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the
Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
Id. at 95.
31. See Cleaveland v. Norton, 60 U.S. (6 Cush.) 380 (1850).
There are two or three general rules of construction. . . . The first is, that all
penal acts are to be construed strictly, and not extended by equity, or by the
probable or supposed intention of the legislature as derived from doubtful words;
but that in order to charge a party with a penalty, he must be brought within its
operation, as manifested by express words or necessary implication.
Id. at 383.
32. Cass, 391 Mass. at 800, 467 N.E.2d at 1325. MolW was decided July 16, 1975,
and section 24G(b) was approved July 2, 1976.
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can reasonably infer that, in enacting section 24G, the Legislature con
templated that the term "person" would be construed to include viable
fetuses. "33
The dissenters saw no substance in the majority's assumption in
view of the well understood meaning of "person" in criminal law. 34
Indeed, the supreme judicial court had itself distinguished Mane as a
civil case and as not controlling in Edelin, a criminal case decided the
year of the enactment of the vehicular homicide statute. 35 Thus,
rather than providing support for the court's decision in Cass, Mane
has been characterized by the court in Edelin as irrelevant with respect
to criminal law. If the court did not regard Mane as applicable to
criminal law, why should the legislature be presumed to have done
SO?36 Furthermore, the legislature could not look to any example from
another jurisdiction in which the decision to include the unborn within
the meaning of "person" for the purposes of civil actions was prece
dent to include the unborn within the meaning of "person" for crimi
nal actions. 37
33. Id. at 801, 467 N.E.2d at 1326.
34. Id. at 809, 467 N.E.2d at 1330 (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
35. Edelin, 371 Mass. at 513 n.23, 359 N.E.2d at 12 n.13. Edelin was decided De
cember 17, 1976--four months after section 24 was approved.
36. Again, no support exists for this assumption in any subsequent acts by the Legis
lature. In particular, chapter 272, § 22, amended and approved December 23, 1977, ap
pears to retain a born alive requirement for the determination of both illegitimacy and
homicide of an illegitimate child. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 22 (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1980). Section 22 reads in part: "A parent who conceals the death of the issue of
such parent, which if born alive would be illegitimate, so that it cannot be ascertained
whether it was born alive or, if born alive, whether it was murdered . . . ." Id. It would
appear that the statute is subjecting parents to punishment for denying to the Common
wealth the necessary evidence for a murder prosecution should there be foul play. That
evidence is live birth of the child.
37. In the first case to decide whether "person" ina vehicular homicide statute in
cludes unborn children, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Dickinson, while recognizing
"person" to include fetuses for the purpose of recovery in civil wrongful death actions,
refused to apply this broad definition of "person" to a criminal statute; "It must be noted
. . . that the definition of a word in a civil statute does not necessarily import the same
meaning to the same word in interpreting a criminal statute. The result may be desirable,
but criminal statutes, unlike civil statutes, must be construed strictly against the state."
State v. Dickinson, 28 Ohio St.2d 65, 70, 275 N.E.2d 599, 602 (1971). When faced with the
identical issue, the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Guthrie, while noting that Michi
gan's wrongful death statute had been interpreted to include the unborn, refused to change
the definition of "person" in a vehicular homicide statute; "It is one thing to mold, change
and even reverse established principles of common law in civil matters. It is quite another
thing to do so in regard to criminal statutes." People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226,232,
293 N.W.2d 775, 778 (1980). Thus, other jurisdictions, while noting the change in the
meaning of "person" in tort claims, have preserved the more restricted meaning in criminal
law and have refused to use civil cases as precedent for changes in criminal statutory inter
pretation. See, supra note II and accompanying text.
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The second ground for the court's decision in Cass was a simple
assertion by the court that the judiciary has the power to redefine
words in criminal statutes. 38 As evidence of this power, the court
pointed to occasions "[w]here the Legislature uses nonspecific terms in
criminal statutes [and where] this court frequently provides necessary
construction and definition from the common law."39 The majority
conceded that "[s]ince at least the fourteenth century the common law
has been that the destruction of a fetus in utero is not a homicide."4O
While it appeared, therefore, that the issue could only be resolved by
excluding the unborn as a class of victims under the statute, the court
concluded instead that "[w]e look to the common law as to whether a
viable fetus can be the victim of a homicide and conclude that it
can."41 In so doing, the court in Cass distinguished ''preexisting''
common law 42 from that which the court has "developed and rede
fined."43 The court felt that considering only preexisting common law
in the course of defining a term in a criminal statute would only
"freeze its meaning."44
The court's self-described role is to provide "definitive common
law rulings required by general language used by the Legislature."45
The court, however, subdivided common law into old and new; the
court characterized hundreds of years of case law and legal thinking as
"preexisting" common law and characterized a handful of recent
cases46 as examples "developed and redefined" common law. 47 By re
fusing to apply "preexisting" common law, the court avoided the obvi
ous implications of Massachusetts common law as restated in
38.
39.
40.

Cass, 392 Mass. at 801, 467 N.E.2d at 1326.
Id.
Id. at 805, 467 N.E.2d at 1328.
41. Id. at 801, 467 N.E.2d at 1326.
42. Id. at 804, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 803, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
46. The court cites three cases where the court has "developed and redefined the
meaning of the common law applicable to other criminal statutes." Cass, 392 Mass. at 804,
467 N.E.2d at 1327. These cases are: Commonwealth v. Lewis, 381 Mass. 411, 409 N.E.2d
771 (1980), cen. denied, 450 U.S. 929 (1981); Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672,405
N.E.2d 927 (1980); Commonwealth v. Golston, 373 Mass. 249, 366 N.E.2d 744 (1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978).
47.
"As distinguished from law created by the enactment of legislatures, the
common law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action, relating
to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their au
thority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antquity, or from the judg
ments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages
and customs. . . ."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250-51 (5th ed. 1979).
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Edelin. 48 In a single stroke, the court "developed and redefined" com
mon law so as to allow the legal meaning of "person" to include the
unborn.
The court in Cass argued that, since Massachusetts has no crimi
nal code,49 the judiciary is able to "develop common law rules of crim
inallaw."50 The primary purpose of a criminal code is to provide "an
integrated body of law"51 in which all crimes are clearly defined by
statute. The lack of codification of criminal law in no way, however,
diminishes the need for strict statutory interpretation. In this regard,
the court's argument appears to evince more than a desire to create
"common law rules"; rather, a desire for new common law crimes.
The court's statement that "we would not want the death of the fetus
to go unpunished"52 clearly manifests this intent.
The power of the court to change the meaning of words in laws
created by the Legislature is the most troubling aspect of the Cass de
cision. By ignoring the common law rule, established in criminal
cases, that "person" includes only those who are born alive, the court
has made an end run around the rule of strict construction of criminal
statutes. The court stated flatly: ". . . we are not persuaded that the
rule of strict construction of criminal statutes prevents us from con
struing the word "person" to include viable fetuses."53 The court,
however, was not unmindful that strict statutory construction
"avoid[s] unconstitutional application of statutes to defendants who
did not have the benefit of the warning provided by our construc
48. See supra notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text.
49. There was a Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts that was never adopted.
PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1972). The
Supreme Judicial Court has often noted the Code in its decisions and its provisions for
particular issues of law have been used as guidance. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 362
Mass. 83, 86 n.3, 283 N.E.2d 840, 843 n.3 (1972) ("the revision commission maintains this
fundamental distinction between robbery and theft."); Commonwealth v. Tarrant, 367
Mass. 411,417 n.6, 326 N.E.2d 710, 715 n.6 (1975) ("the definition of a dangerous weapon
adopted in the Proposed Criminal Code of Massachusetts ... is well stated . . ."). The
Proposed Code is explicit as to whether a fetus is a person: "'human being' means a person
who has been born and is alive." PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch.
265, § I(c) (Michie/Law. Coop. 1972). The court in Cass did not mention the definition of
"human being" in the Proposed Code.
50. Cass, 392 Mass. at 803, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
51. PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ch. 263, § 2(a) (Michie/Law.
Co-op. 1972). Common law crimes are abolished by the Code. See PROPOSED CRIMINAL
CODE OF MASSACHUSETTS ch. 263, § 6 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1972). Only offenses defined
by statute are crimes. Id.
52. Cass, 392 Mass. at 807, 467 N.E.2d at 1329 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 804, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
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tion."54 In order to avoid such constitutional issues in Cass, the court
elected to apply its decision prospectively. 55
Using prospectivity to avoid an unconstitutional application of
the criminal statute fails, however, to address the concern as to the
appropriateness of the judiciary acting so as to expand the class of
victims of a criminal statute. 56 The doctrine of strict construction,
while serving to ensure fair warning and certainty, has the additional
function of preserving the distinct roles of the legislative and judicial
branches of government. 57 By restricting judicial interpretation of
criminal statutory language to the common law understanding, legisla
tive intent is preserved. The court's conclusion that prospective appli
cation "satisfies the rationale of the rule of strict construction" is thus
not completely correct. 58 By refusing to apply the doctrine, the court
has obscured the role of the jUdiciary.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASS DECISION

In Cass, the court does not comment on the effect of its decision
on other criminal statutes. The Massachusetts homicide statute de
fines murder as the "killing of a human being, with malice afore
thought."59 Because "human being" is left undefined, it is not clear
how the court, in view of the Cass decision, would define "human be
ing." In particular, it is not clear whether "human being" includes
viable fetuses for the purposes of the homicide statute. 60
The California Supreme Court was the first court faced with the
question of whether the killing of an unborn child constituted the kill
ing of a "human being" within the meaning of a homicide statute. 61
In Keeler v. Superior Court,62 a husband beat his estranged wife so as
54. Id.
55. Id. at 805, 467 N.E.2d at 1328. Recognition by the court in Cass of a notice and
fair warning issue is, itself, an admission that the court is changing the law and not merely
determining the intent of the legislature. Id. at 789-99, 467 N.E.2d at 1325.
56. The Massachusetts Constitution expressly provides for the distinct roles of the
legislative and judicial branches of government; "the judicial shall never exercise the legis
lative and executive powers or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws
and not of men." MASS CONST. Pt. I, art. XXX.
57. See supra note 30.
58. Cass, 392 Mass. at 805, 467 N.E.2d at 1328.
59. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 277 § 39 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1972).
60. The abortion statutes do not resolve this question; "unborn child" is defined as
"the individual human life in existence and developing from fertilization until birth."
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 112 § 12K (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1972).
61. The California Penal Code had provided that "[mJurder is the unlawful killing of
a human being, with malice aforethought." CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1959).
62. 2 Cal.3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
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to cause deliberately the death of an eight month old fetus fathered by
another man. 63 The California Supreme Court, in granting a writ to
prevent the superior court from proceeding with the murder prosecu
tion, upheld the common law born alive requirement and refused to
include the unborn within the meaning of "human being" for the pur
poses of the homicide statute. 64
Absent a clear statute to the contrary, every state that has consid
ered whether the killing of an unborn child constitutes a homicide has
followed the ruling of the California Supreme Court. 65 Ifa case with
facts similar to Keeler were to confront the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, the implications of the Cass decision may force a differ
ent outcome. The first independent ground for the Cass decision
rested on the fact that the vehicular homicide statute followed on the
heels of the Mone decision. 66 The Massachusetts homicide statute was
enacted much earlier.67 Thus, the supreme judicial court would be
faced with the possibility of holding that, while "person" includes the
unborn in vehicular homicide actions, "human being" does not in
clude the unborn in a murder prosecution because the legislature en
acted the homicide statute prior to the Mone decision. Such a holding
is unlikely in the face of such a serious inconsistency in the criminal
law. 68
The second independent ground for the Cass holding rested on
the court's inherent power to "develop and redefine" the common
law. 69 From this perspective, it is hard to see any principle that would
prevent the court from expanding the meaning of "human being" in
63. Id. at 623-24, 470 P.2d at 618-19, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (1970).
64. Id. at 649, 470 P.2d at 630,87 Cal. Rptr. at 483 (1970). The California Supreme
Court stated "it is clear the court cannot go so far as to create an offense by enlarging a
statute . . . by giving the terms used false or unusual meanings." Id. at 632, 470 P.2d at
625-26, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90. The court reasoned that "[flor a court to simply declare,
by judicial fiat, that the time has now come to prosecute . . . one who kills an unborn, but
viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute under the guise of construing it." Id.
65. See State v. Brown, 378 So.2d 916 (La. 1979) ("person" does not include fetuses
for the purpose of the homicide statute); People v. Greer, 79 m.2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203
(1980) ("individual" does not include the unborn for the purposes of the homicide statute);
Hollis v. Commonwealth, 652 S.W.2d 61 (Ky. 1983) ("death of another person" does not
include the death of the unborn for purposes of the homicide statute). See also Annot., 40
A.L.R.3d 444 (1971).
66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. The original language of the Massachusetts homicide statute was adopted in
1899.
68. This potential inconsistency illuminates the danger of assuming, absent an ex
plicit indication otherwise, that a statute is merely the product of court action that chrono
logically precedes it.
69. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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all criminal homicide statutes so as to include the unborn. 70 This is
particularly true in the light of the broad language of the court that
"our criminal law should extend its protection to viable fetuses."7l
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority's characterization in Cass of their authority to abol
ish the born alive rule for the purposes of a criminal statute is mislead
ing. On the one hand, the conclusion that the legislature, in using the
word "person" in section 24G(b), applied the Mane definition appears
contraindicated by the court's own decision in Edelin to affirm the
born alive requirement. On the other hand, the court's independent
conclusion that it is appropriate to redefine terms that are well under
stood in criminal statutes simply because they may be outmoded runs
afoul of the doctrine of strict construction of criminal statutory
language.
It may indeed be desirable to do away with the born alive require
ment and thereby bring the unborn under the protection of the homi
cide statutes. Such a major change in the law, however, should come
from the legislature. By avoiding the doctrine of strict construction,
the court in Cass has made the line between judicial interpretation of
statutes and judicial lawmaking a thin one at best.
Peter G. Carroll

70. The doctrine of strict construction might be side-stepped as in Casso See supra
note 56 and accompanying text.
71. Cass, 392 Mass. at 807, 467 N.E.2d at 1330.

